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An emerging body of evidence suggests that our penchant for entertaining thoughts that
are unrelated to ongoing activities might be a detriment to our emotional wellbeing. In
light of this evidence, researchers have posited that mindwandering is a cause rather
than a manifestation of discontent. We review the evidence in support of this viewpoint.
We then consider this evidence in a broader context—with regards to mindwandering’s
antecedents, respecting the observation that people frequently find pleasure in their
off-task moments, and in light of the lay beliefs people hold about its causes. We
report data from two studies that speak to the potential challenges of establishing
a definitive causal link between mindwandering and wellbeing. First, to advance the
idea that mindwandering can convey affective benefits, in spite of negative feelings
about mental disengagement, we examined cortical responses in a unique individual
who presents with a long history of excessive—but enjoyable—task-irrelevant thinking.
Second, to explore the idea that lay beliefs about mindwandering may substantially color
the affective responses people have to a mindwandering episode, we surveyed people’s
beliefs about mindwandering’s antecedents and related them to the affective reactions
people anticipated to off-task moments. Our hope is to provide a nuanced evaluation of
the available evidence for the assertion that mindwandering causes unhappiness, and to
provide a clear direction forward to better evaluate this possibility.
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People spend an estimated one third to one half of their wak-
ing lives mindwandering (Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth and
Gilbert, 2010). The sheer ubiquity of these off-task moments
has prompted researchers to consider how mindwandering might
impact our emotional lives. How does frequently entertain-
ing task-irrelevant thoughts make us feel? An emerging body
of evidence—including our own (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2007,
2009a; Mar et al., 2012)—indicates that mindwandering can be
associated with diminished psychological well-being. These find-
ings and others have prompted some researchers to conclude
that mindwandering causes unhappiness (e.g., Killingsworth and
Gilbert, 2010). Although we certainly agree mindwandering can
be a source of discontent, we suggest its relationship with well-
being may be complex. In this piece, we discuss the barriers
to drawing a causal link between attentional lapses and dimin-
ished well-being. We also review and attempt to reconcile the
conflicting evidence surrounding the relation between mindwan-
dering and emotional states. In doing so, our hope is to provide
a nuanced evaluation of the available evidence for the assertion
that mindwandering causes unhappiness, and to provide a clear
direction forward to better evaluate this possibility.
We begin by summarizing existing evidence in support of the
view that mindwandering causes unhappiness. We then consider
this evidence in light of two factors: (1) the known triggers of
mindwandering and (2) the mental states of individuals who
frequently mindwander. We then attempt to reconcile evidence
that mindwandering causes discontent with evidence that people
frequently find pleasure in their off-task moments, arguing for
a distinction between affect experienced during mindwandering
and affective reactions to noting one’s mind has strayed. We close
with a discussion of how lay beliefs about why the mind wan-
ders might shape people’s perceptions of their moods following a
mindwandering episode.
EVIDENCE OF A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
MINDWANDERING AND NEGATIVE AFFECT
A small but burgeoning body of evidence suggests that nega-
tive affect tends to accompany failure to attend to an ongoing
task. For example, frequent absentmindedness is associated with
lower affective well-being, based on self-reports of the propen-
sity to experience brief lapses of attention (Cheyne et al., 2006).
Follow-up work clarified that a chronic inability to engage in
and sustain attention toward an ongoing task frequently gives
rise to boredom, which in turn results in persistent negative
affect (Carriere et al., 2008). Self-reported frequency of mind-
wandering has also been related to negative affect in both North
America and Europe (Mar et al., 2012; Stawarczyk et al., 2012).
Consistent with these findings, people who experience more
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frequent dysphoric episodes also appear to report more frequent
absentmindedness and exhibit a diminished capacity for sus-
tained attention (Watts et al., 1988; Wagle et al., 1999; Farrin
et al., 2003). Smallwood and colleagues have documented a posi-
tive correlation between dysphoria and frequent mindwandering
across a wide range of cognitive tasks, including word learning
(Smallwood et al., 2003, 2004b), sustained attention (Smallwood
et al., 2004a), and simple word-fragment completion (Smallwood
et al., 2004b).
In light of these associations, a key challenge researchers con-
front moving forward is determining the directionality of any
causal relationship that might exist between mindwandering and
negative affect. Although our focus is the extent to which there
is evidence that mindwandering causes diminished well-being, it
is important to point out that a case has already been made for
the reverse: negative affect causing more frequent mindwander-
ing. For example, Smallwood and colleagues argue that negative
moods diminish the amount of attention people commit to an
ongoing task, giving way to task-irrelevant thoughts regarding
personal concerns (Smallwood et al., 2005, 2007, 2009a,b see
also Power and Dalgleish, 1997; Teasdale, 1999) and past events
(Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011). In line with this argument,
negative affect is especially likely to impair sustained attention
when people have highly accessible, unresolved personal concerns
(Lyubomirsky et al., 2003). It is worth noting that the argument
that negative mood increases off-task thinking is based largely
on data that is correlational and thus insufficient for making
definitive causal claims. Does compelling evidence of the reverse
causal relationship exist: How much confidence should we place
in the claim that mindwandering directly diminishes feelings of
well-being?
In recent work, Marchetti et al. (2012) examined whether
mindwandering diminishes well-being and if this is a result of
people (1) entertaining negative thoughts during mindwander-
ing episodes or (2) mindwandering increasing self-focus which in
turn leads to dysphoria (Mor and Winquist, 2002). Contrary to
the view that the effect of mindwandering on well-being is medi-
ated by negative thinking, the authors found no evidence that
people who experience more frequent mindwandering entertain
more negative thoughts in off task-moments. Nor did they find
a relationship between negative thinking while mindwandering
and diminished feelings of well-being. They did, however, report
finding that a diminished ability to sustain attention on a cur-
rent task is associated with heightened accessibility of negative
constructs (as measured with a scrambled sentence task involv-
ing negative words) among people with moderate to high levels
of depressive symptoms. The authors interpret this as evidence
that fully coupling attention to an external task prevents people
who are predisposed to negativity or rumination from entertain-
ing disturbing thoughts. Although these results are interesting,
they do not provide strong evidence that mindwandering causes
negative affect because (1) off-task thinking related to an increase
in the accessibility of negative constructs only among those who
were already depressed (and even then, not causally so) and (2)
there was no evidence that more frequent mindwandering among
people with moderate to high levels of depressive symptoms was
associated with heightened experience of negative feelings.
The view that decoupling attention from events in the here
and now diminishes well-being is common among researchers
who study mindfulness, with mindfulness defined as “the state of
being attentive to and aware of what is taking place in the present”
(Brown and Ryan, 2003; p.822; for review see Brown et al.,
2007; Keng et al., 2011). There is evidence in favor of this view
from mindfulness research, with people low in trait mindfulness
also reporting a greater number of depressive symptoms, more
unpleasant affect, lower life satisfaction, and a greater number of
recent visits to medical professionals than those high in mind-
fulness (Brown and Ryan, 2003, Study 1; Carlson and Brown,
2005). Low levels of trait mindfulness are also associated with
a tendency toward rumination (Raes and Williams, 2010), diffi-
culties in emotion regulation (Baer et al., 2006), as well as more
frequent negative spontaneous thoughts and a diminished ability
to disregard those thoughts (Frewen et al., 2008). These studies
are correlational in nature, and do not support causal inferences,
however. Consistent with the view that momentary fluctuations
in mindfulness prompt changes in affect, results of experience-
sampling studies reveal that when individuals are less attentive
to the day-to-day activities in which they are engaged, they also
report more unpleasant emotion and diminished feelings of con-
trol (Brown and Ryan, 2003, Study 4; see also Killingsworth and
Gilbert, 2010).
Aside from the correlational studies, there is work demonstrat-
ing that learning to be mindful of ongoing activities is followed
by improvements in well-being. In two landmark intervention
studies, Kabta-Zinn and colleagues found that enrolling in a
standardized 8-week mindfulness program was associated with
diminished unpleasant symptoms among patients with chronic
pain (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1985) and anxiety (Kabat-Zinn et al.,
1992). Numerous researchers have since demonstrated that mind-
fulness training reduces the risk of relapse into depression and
diminishes other depression-related outcomes (cf., Teasdale et al.,
2000; Ma and Teasdale, 2004; Bondolfi et al., 2010; Godfrin and
Van Heeringen, 2010; for recent review see Chiesa and Serretti,
2011). Although one can make a stronger case for a causal effect
of attention on well-being based on this evidence, note that these
studies generally only test whether compliance with the train-
ing is associated with subsequent improvements in well-being;
this is not the same as showing that increases in present-oriented
attention mediate the improvements in well-being (see, however,
Brown and Ryan, 2003, Study 5).
It is also worth mentioning recent evidence that mindwan-
dering plays a role in creative problem-solving. Compared to
rest or engaging tasks, tasks that promote mindwandering seem
to facilitate divergent thinking (Baird et al., 2012; see also Sio
and Ormerod, 2009). Although the precise mechanism by which
mindwandering enhances creativity is uncertain, a large body of
research reveals that positive mood enhances divergent thinking
(e.g., Abele-Brehm, 1992; Baas et al., 2008). Thus, it is possible
that mindwandering enhances creativity by improving mood.
Perhaps the strongest evidence for the view that mindwan-
dering causes psychological distress is found in the work of
Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010). These authors developed a
smartphone application to sample the thoughts and feelings of
2250 adult participants at random intervals. A few times each
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day, participants were prompted to indicate their level of happi-
ness, report the activity in which they were currently engaged,
and judge whether their mind was anchored on this activ-
ity (i.e., whether they were task-engaged or mindwandering).
People were happier when their attention was directed at what
they were doing compared to when their attention had wan-
dered to task-irrelevant information. Furthermore, they observed
that previous mindwandering predicted later unhappiness, but
that current unhappiness did not predict subsequent mindwan-
dering. They thus concluded that mindwandering is the cause,
and not the consequence, of unhappiness. This work is impres-
sive for a number of reasons, including the sample size, the
ecologically-valid context, and the daily diary approach. However,
their conclusion—that mindwandering causes unhappiness—
should be examined more closely for a number of reasons, in our
opinion. For one, the researchers randomly sampled their par-
ticipants a maximum of three times a day. Thus the time-series
approach they adopt to establish causality involves hours-long
lags between current unhappiness and previous and subsequent
mindwandering. The longitudinal samples may be spaced too
far apart (several hours) to be credible for causal analysis. In
the next section, we consider another potential problem that
is common in mindwandering research: unaccounted-for third
variables.
ACCOUNTING FOR THE EFFECT OF “THIRD VARIABLES”
An obvious issue with correlational data is that inferring the
direction of causality is difficult. Does mindwandering diminish
well-being or does diminished well-being trigger mindwander-
ing? Or are both possibilities true? These questions cannot be
answered unequivocally with purely correlational data. A second
potential issue, one we feel is easy to overlook, is that unob-
served third factors might be responsible for the correlation
between mindwandering and well-being. For example, disposi-
tional anxiety or situational stress can make focusing on a given
task difficult, and both are also directly related to decreased well-
being. Unobserved variables could account for a mindwandering-
wellbeing association, even if the data have a temporal compo-
nent, as is the case with the time-lagged analysis performed by
Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010). This problem of spurious cor-
relation, in which two variables are correlated but not due to any
direct causal relationship, is an issue closely related to the omitted
variable bias in regression analyses (Greene, 2002; Clarke, 2005).
A credible causal argument about the emotional consequences
of mindwandering must involve a genuine effort to measure and
account for third variables that might cause both discontent and
mindwandering. This is bound to be difficult, especially in the
absence of a fully formed component process model that can help
identify what processes control the initiation of a mindwandering
episode (Smallwood, 2013).
Researchers seeking definitive evidence that mindwandering
causes discontent would be well-served by not only gathering
data that make directional claims possible, but also by attempting
to rule out competing explanations when collecting correlational
data. We would like to stress that both approaches are valuable.
Although experimental manipulations allow for causal inferences,
this approach suffers from reduced ecological validity. While
cross-sectional survey data introduces problems with properly
inferring causal direction, they allow us to examine mindwander-
ing in a more ecologically valid context. In the case of mindwan-
dering and well-being, there are a host of possible candidate third
variables that are important to consider, including task character-




Monotonous, invariable events that are slow to progress
are known to both prompt an increase in mindwandering
(Antrobus et al., 1966) and to diminish well-being (Neu, 1998).
Unsurprisingly, boring tasks encourage mindwandering and
diminish wellbeing. Hence, in research examining the relation
between mindwandering and negative affect, probing for the con-
comitant presence of monotonous circumstances that could cause
an increase in both is therefore important.
LIFE EVENTS
Unresolved personal concerns
According to the current concerns theory (Klinger, 1971, 1977,
1996), committing to any goal potentiates emotional responses to
and cognitive processing of internal and external cues associated
with its pursuit. As a consequence, between committing to a goal
and attaining it, people are more likely to spontaneously think
about the goal than they would have otherwise. Consistent with
this motivational account of thought content, a large and bur-
geoning body of evidence suggests people often reflect on unful-
filled goals while mindwandering (e.g., Klinger, 1977; Klinger
et al., 1980; Mason et al., 2009), especially goals whose attain-
ment has become problematic (Klinger, 1977; Klinger et al.,
1980). Thus, doubt about one’s ability to attain an important,
unfulfilled goal can increase mindwandering and can also dimin-
ish well-being, possibly creating a spurious relationship between
the two.
Disconcerting news
Another possible third variable related to unresolved personal
concerns is the introduction of disconcerting news. Receiving
disconcerting news can cause both increased mindwandering
and diminished well-being. For example, in their seminal work,
Antrobus et al. (1966) exposed participants to a radio broad-
cast announcing that China was entering the Vietnam War and
the United States was planning a retaliation. This cover story was
credible given that the study was conducted in June of 1965, dur-
ing the initial escalation of the VietnamWar. Participants exposed
to this broadcast reported a significant increase in task-irrelevant
thinking and also experienced stronger feelings of despair, worry,
anxiety, fear, and so forth. In fact, the work of Horowitz (1975)
suggests that the disconcerting event need only be moderately
stressful to cause both an increase in off-task thought and a
decrease in well-being. Experimental studies that involve a stress-
ful event must therefore establish that any association observed
between mindwandering frequency and negative affect is not due
to the independent effect of receiving disconcerting news or of
being placed under stress. For correlational data, measuring and
controlling for situational stress is similarly important.
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INDIVIDUAL DISPOSITIONS
Depression
As discussed above, a large body of evidence reveals that depressed
individuals exhibit higher levels of mindwandering than their
non-depressed counterparts (Watts et al., 1988; Smallwood et al.,
2007). Levels of depressive symptoms in sub-clinical participant
populations also predict mindwandering frequency (Smallwood
et al., 2003, 2005). This state of affairs raises the possibility that
mindwandering does not create dysphoria, but rather that both
are a consequence of a common cause: depression. The view
that heightened mindwandering and diminished affect might co-
occur because they are both independently related to depression
is consistent with the findings of Marchetti et al. (2012), who only
observe the link between mindwandering and negative cognitions
in those with moderate to high levels of depression.
Neuroticism
Evidence suggests that neuroticism—a personality trait char-
acterized by anxiety, moodiness, worry, and envy—might also
explain the relationship between mindwandering and dysphoria.
Compared to their low-neuroticism counterparts, people high on
this trait experience more frequent mindwandering (e.g., Baer
et al., 2006; Giluk, 2009) and report lower levels of well-being
(e.g., Diener et al., 1999). Correlations between mindwandering
and well-being might reflect the fact that neuroticism prompts
more off-task thinking and has a separate, diminishing effect
on well-being. For example, Brown and Ryan (2003) reported
that the tendency for people who were low in “present-oriented
thinking” (i.e., trait mindfulness) to report diminished levels of
well-being reduced dramatically when the authors controlled for
the effect of neuroticism.
Mental self-regulation/trait mindfulness
A third individual difference that might give rise to a spuri-
ous association between mindwandering and negative affect is
mental self-regulation. People who are poor at regulating their
mental contents can be thought of as being high in the trait
tendency toward mindwandering. These individuals experience
more frequent mindwandering (Brown and Ryan, 2003; Burg and
Michalak, 2011; Mrazek et al., 2012) and are less effective at shap-
ing both the affective reactions they have to their thoughts (e.g.,
reframing negative reactions to internal and external events, etc.;
Frewen et al., 2008; Keng et al., 2011) and correcting/repairing
unpleasant mood states (Brown and Ryan, 2003; Baer et al.,
2004; Creswell et al., 2007). These findings raise the possibil-
ity that mindwandering does not cause dysphoria, but rather
both are a consequence of poor mental self-regulation. Consistent
with this possibility, a recent study found that trait mindfulness
fully explains the relationship between mindwandering frequency
and psychological distress (Stawarczyk et al., 2012; however, see
Brown and Ryan, 2003, Study 5). This finding, and others, illus-
trates the importance of measuring and controlling for possible
third variables. In this study, mindwandering did not directly
cause discontent in the sample of participants; rather, both were
a consequence of poor mental self-regulation.
Although certainly not exhaustive, this list of possible
third variables that could account for relations between
mindwandering and dysphoria serves an illustrative purpose.
Absent measurement and control of the individual dispositions,
life events, and task characteristics that cause changes in both
mindwandering and mood, identifying whether mindwandering
causally impacts happiness or if the two are spuriously corre-
lated is difficult. The list helps to demonstrate that assertions
regarding causality are greatly undermined when possibly con-
founding factors are not measured and taken into account. For
example, observing a link between mindwandering and dimin-
ished well-being becomes more compelling when these variables
are measured and taken into account. More generally, to move
beyond this descriptive analysis, it will be necessary to develop
a fully specified model of the mind-wandering state from which
clear and unambiguous predictions can be made regarding the
hypothesized mechanism by which mind-wandering influences
mood (and vice-versa).
AFFECTIVE REACTIONS TO MINDWANDERING VERSUS
AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCESWHILE MINDWANDERING
Beyond possible third variables that might cause both mind-
wandering and negative affect, another barrier to evaluating the
veracity of causal claims is a precise understanding of what such
an account predicts. For example, it is not entirely clear if the
argument being made is that the more one mindwanders on aver-
age, the greater one’s average level of unhappiness or if the claim
is that mindwandering has an immediate, transitory effect on
mometary mood states. Perhaps both are true? Not only is there
uncertainty around the timeframe and duration of mindwander-
ing’s effects, the nature and source of the negativity are unclear.
One view is that mindwandering diminishes wellbeing because
the experience itself is inherently unpleasant. Alternatively, the
diminished well-being might reflect the fact that people respond
to their mental meandering with frustration and concern over
the lack of control they have over their attention. Our point
is that judging the strength and coherence of the available evi-
dence is challenging when the accounts of mindwandering are
underspecified.
We propose that one step toward resolving this issue involves
drawing a distinction between the affect experienced during
mindwandering and affective reactions to noticing one’s mind
has strayed. It seems possible for people to derive pleasure from
a mindwandering act but still react negatively to noticing that
their attention has drifted to task-unrelated matters. By respect-
ing the difference between the two, we might reconcile some of
the inconsistencies in the current corpus of evidence.
To this point, we have focused on evidence that mindwander-
ing is associated with diminished well-being and have ignored the
affective benefits of decoupling ourselves from the current sen-
sory environment. Contrary to the view that sustained-attention
failures necessarily lead to diminished well-being is a body of evi-
dence showing that people allow their minds to wander to cope
with dull or stressful task settings. For example, people com-
monly report using daydreams to ease boredom at work (Singer,
1961; Molstad, 1986; Fisher, 1987). Individuals with a procliv-
ity for mindwandering also exhibit less physiological reactance
to stressful events (Singer and Antrobus, 1963) and asking peo-
ple to mentally wander from the current moment diminishes
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the stress response they exhibit in anticipation of an electrical
shock (Rowe, 1963). In children, a strong proclivity towardmind-
wandering is associated with enhanced patience and self-control
(Singer, 1961). In other words, ample evidence suggests people
look to mindwandering to provide emotional respite from stress-
ful or boring circumstances. To the extent that people are drawn
to entertain themselves with internal reveries, they depend less on
the external world for entertainment.
Could people enjoy the mindwandering experience but feel
negatively about their mental disengagement? An initial evalua-
tion of this proposal is available. We examined cortical responses
in a unique individual recently described by Schupak and
Rosenthal (2009). This person presents with a long history of
uncontrolled and excessive daydreaming that is not coincident
with any other clinical disorders. This individual reports con-
cern about the amount of her daydreaming, yet considers it a
“treasured activity.” We examined the neural correlates of her
mindwandering, using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), and undertook two studies: (1) we contrasted mindwan-
dering with both task-focused thought and periods of mindwan-
dering suppression, and (2) we observed intrinsic correlations
in brain activity during unconstrained thought (i.e., seed-based
resting-state functional connectivity analysis; see Appendix for
details).
We were interested in determining whether mindwandering
is associated with increased fMRI responses in brain areas asso-
ciated with positive, rewarding experiences. Brain imaging and
electrophysiological work with non-human primates has iden-
tified the dorsal and ventral striatum, especially the nucleus
accumbens (nACC), as important for the subjective experience
of pleasure (e.g., Apicella et al., 1991). If mindwandering can be
enjoyable or rewarding in someone who is chronically concerned
about the frequency of its occurrence, activity in these areas
should increase during periods of active and absorbing thought
that is decoupled from the sensory environment.
Consistent with this view, relative to periods of task-focused
thought and mindwandering suppression, periods of active
mindwandering were associated with increased activity in dorsal
and ventral striatal regions, including the nACC (a reward area;
Figure 1). Furthermore, our resting-state analysis revealed that
signal in the nACC fluctuated with four regions associated with
mindwandering [i.e., the default network (Mason et al., 2007;
Christoff et al., 2009)]: the medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior
cingulate cortex, and the bilateral supramarginal gyri (Figure 2).
FIGURE 1 | (A,B) Results of the “mindwander > concentrate” contrast,
p < 0.005; k = 10. (C) Results of the “mindwander > suppress” contrast,
p < 0.005; k = 10 superimposed. Results are displayed on the MNI
single-subject TI anatomical image. nACC, nucleus accumbens.
Therefore, even in someone who is disturbed by a recalcitrant
mind that will not “stay put,” the experience of mindwandering
can be both subjectively pleasurable and biologically rewarding.
These findings provide tentative support for the hypothesis that
mindwandering can be a self-rewarding activity, even in the pres-
ence of concern regarding its frequency. By no means do we
intend to suggest that people derive pleasure from all of their
mindwandering experiences. We simply wish to highlight that the
affect experienced while mindwandering and affective reactions
to mindwandering are dissociable.
The core issue is that mindwandering seems to be a vehicle
by which people project themselves from the current situations
to which they are confined. The emotional consequences of this
mental teleportation presumably depend on where it leads and if
it interferes with an ongoing task to which one is committed. We
have no doubt that mindwandering is a source of discontent and
irritation, especially when it interferes with efficient and effective
performance of a crucial current task. It also seems reasonable
to assume that the emotional consequences of mindwander-
ing depend on where the mind has wandered (cf., Mar et al.,
2012). We suspect that mindwandering that involves a worrisome
or negative topic will lead to diminished well-being, especially
among individuals who are chronically distracted by pessimistic
topics (e.g., individuals with depression). Consistent with this
possibility, the thought “recycling” (i.e., rumination) that charac-
terizes chronic depression is believed to increase both the length
and severity of depressive episodes (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema and
Morrow, 1993).
Our point is that extrapolating beyond contrived experimental
conditions to other contexts requires a clear and precise mecha-
nistic story of the everyday emotional consequences of mindwan-
dering. A complete mechanistic account would seem to require
consideration of the content of off-task thoughts (Watkins, 2008,
2010; Critcher and Gilovich, 2010; Mar et al., 2012; Smallwood,
2013), the nature of the task from which the mind wandered, and
FIGURE 2 | Results of resting-state scan analysis revealed that the
signal in the patient’s nucleus accumbens (nACC) fluctuated with four
default network regions: the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the
posterior cingulate cortex (pCC), and bilateral supramarginal gyri
(SMG). Panel (A) depicts the seed regions used to generate the
resting-state maps. Panel (B) depicts results from a sagittal orientation.
Panel (C) depicts results from an axial orientation. Results displayed on
participant’s T1 anatomical image.
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whether the primary task requires full attention or if its simplicity
allows people to entertain task-irrelevant thoughts concurrent to
its pursuit (Teasdale et al., 1995; Mason et al., 2007; Smallwood
et al., 2009b, 2011).
ROLE OF CAUSAL LAY THEORIES OF MINDWANDERING
In conjunction with the problem of third variables causing spuri-
ous correlations and distinguishing affective reactions to mind-
wandering from affective experiences while mindwandering, it
is important to examine lay beliefs about mindwandering and
how these might influence affective reactions to mindwandering.
For decades, psychologists have noted that people construct plau-
sible, quasi-scientific stories to understand, predict, and justify
events in the world (e.g., Bruner, 1957; Heider, 1958; Kruglanski,
1980; Snyder and Gangestad, 1981; Hastie, 1983). These stories
are known as implicit theories, lay theories, naïve theories, or
causal schemata. Using these lay theories, people extrapolate from
available data, construct explanations about what caused a certain
event, and draw various inferences about themselves or others in
relation to the event (Dweck et al., 1995; Morris et al., 2001).
Some lay theories oversimplify the truth, whereas others are
demonstrably wrong. However, all lay theories shape how people
understand the phenomenon they are purported to describe. For
example, despite having considerable experience observing tennis
balls, water balloons, and other projectiles in flight, people have
striking misconceptions about the principles that govern the tra-
jectories of moving objects. Their mistakes are not random, but
appear to arise from a widely shared intuitive theory of motion
that adequately guides people’s everyday interactions with mov-
ing objects but contradicts the laws of Newtonian mechanics (see
Chi et al., 1981; McCloskey, 1983; DiSessa, 1993). These lay theo-
ries extend beyond the physical world to our shared social world,
applied to such topics as trait personality (Kelly, 1955), intelli-
gence (Dweck and Leggett, 1988), group behavior (Lickel et al.,
2001), agency (Heider, 1958; Morris and Peng, 1994), and minds
(Gopnik andMeltzoff, 1987;Wellman, 1990; cf. Ames andMason,
2012).
With respect to lay beliefs about mindwandering, Critcher
and Gilovich (2010) argue that mindwandering poses an attri-
butional dilemma because an off-task moment can either be
seen as resulting from the banal nature of an ongoing task or
from some compelling property of the object of one’s wander-
ing mind. Either could prompt an off-task moment. Their results
revealed that when the cause of mindwandering was ambiguous,
participants resolved this atttributional dilemma by referencing
the content of their mindwandering. Participants reported being
bored by the task only when their mind wandered (1) to future
or ongoing activities and not events of the past and (2) to multi-
ple topics and not just one topic. They thus conclude that people
forestall the deduction that their mindwandering is driven by task
boredom when their musings involve an enjoyable event of the
past or revolve around a single, distinctive topic versus several
different ones.
These findings raise the possibility that people might similarly
rely on a lay theory of mindwandering to understand how their
off-task moments relate to their current well-being. That is, upon
noticing one’s mind has wandered from a current task, people
might use their intuitive beliefs about when and why the mind
wanders to infer a cause for the off-task moment and draw infer-
ences about their current emotional state. Do people have beliefs
about what causes their mindwandering? Is it possible that the
feelings people report subsequent to an off-task moment depend
on assumptions they make about its causes? It seems reasonable to
expect that people who assume mindwandering is caused by per-
sonal flaws, impoverished activities, or disconcerting topics might
respond to off-task moments with more distress than people who
assume mindwandering occurs because attention tends to wax
and wane naturally.
We obtained some preliminary evidence for this possibility by
asking a sample of 361 participants (details in Appendix) about
their affective reactions to and lay beliefs regarding mindwander-
ing. More specifically, using the PANAS (Tellegen et al., 1988),
we asked participants to indicate the extent to which they would
feel various moods after a hypothetical mindwandering event.
We also asked them to indicate the extent to which they agreed
with a series of statements concerning the causes of mindwander-
ing. As expected, participants commonly reported believing that
dull tasks and distractible dispositions causemindwandering. The
belief that mindwandering occurs when important, enjoyable, or
worrisome topics compete for attention to an ongoing tasks was
also fairly common. Finally, there was some consensus around
the idea that mindwandering is a natural feature of an informa-
tion processing system that periodically disengages from ongoing
events and activities (Table 1).
To determine whether lay beliefs might account for the
emotions experienced as a result of mindwandering, we com-
puted the correlation between lay beliefs about the causes of
mindwandering and anticipated positive and negative affect
after a mindwandering event. As expected, greater endorse-
ment of the belief that mindwandering is caused by a dis-
tractible disposition is associated with anticipations of less pos-
itive and more negative feelings after off-task moments. Similarly,
believing that mindwandering is caused by dull activities is
associated with anticipations of negative feelings after off-task
moments. In contrast, believing that mindwandering is the
result of a natural waxing and waning of attention is associ-
ated with less anticipated negativity after an off-task moment
(Table 2).
These results raise the possibility that beliefs about mindwan-
dering can increase the likelihood that one will interpret (possibly
erroneously) an off-moment thought as evidence of discontent-
ment. It is important for us to emphasize that this is not evidence
that people who endorse the view that mindwandering causes
negative moods are wrong; not all lay beliefs are de facto incor-
rect. However, these data confirm that the affective experiences
people report as a result of mindwandering are not independent
of their explicit beliefs about when and why the mind leaves a
current task.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this piece we have surveyed the link between mindwandering
and affect while sounding a note of caution about interpreting
these results in a causal light. The observed connections between
mindwandering and diminished well-being are complex and
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Table 1 | Lay theories regarding causes of mindwandering.
Cause Mean SD t-score Mean diff. Lower Upper
Occurs because I’m a distractible person 3.25 0.97 4.96** 0.25 0.15 0.35
Is caused by dull activities 3.85 0.80 20.07** 0.85 0.76 0.93
Is the result of my attention waxing and waning naturally 3.67 0.79 16.14** 0.67 0.59 0.75
Occurs because I enjoy thinking about the topics to which my mind wanders 3.41 0.80 9.89** 0.41 0.33 0.50
Occurs because the topics to which my mind wanders are important 3.34 0.79 8.19** 0.34 0.26 0.42
Occurs because the topics to which my mind wanders are worrisome 3.10 0.85 2.30* 0.10 0.01 0.19
Responses made using a Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Not at all true) to 5 (Definitely true) To determine if there was consensus around these beliefs we conducted
a one-sample T-test (df = 360), examining whether the mean differed from the midpoint (3). *p < 0.05; **p < 0.001. Lower and Upper represent a 95% confidence
interval for the mean difference from the midpoint.
Table 2 | Prediction of mood subsequent to mindwandering, by Lay Beliefs.
Correlation
Most of my mindwandering Positive affect Negative affect
Occurs because I’m a distractible person −0.17** 0.13*
Is caused by dull activities −0.30** −0.08
Is the result of my attention waxing and waning naturally −0.11* −0.15**
Occurs because I enjoy thinking about the topics to which my mind wanders 0.02 −0.09
Occurs because the topics to which my mind wanders are important −0.03 0.02
Occurs because the topics to which my mind wanders are worrisome −0.02 0.15**
Respondents (N = 361) rated the degree to which they would feel positive and negative affect using the PANAS (Tellegen et al., 1988; 1 = very slightly or not at all;
5 = Extremely). Correlation between lay beliefs about the causes of mindwandering and anticipated moods after a hypothetical mindwandering event. *p < 0.05;
**p < 0.01.
likely multiply determined. In particular, we suggest that there
could be many “third factors” that could explain the association
between mindwandering and diminished well-being. These fac-
tors include issues pertaining to individual dispositions (depres-
sion, mental self-regulation), life events (unresolved personal
concerns, disconcerting news), and task characteristics (invariable
or slow tasks).
In addition, we report data from two studies that speak to
the potential challenges of establishing a definitive causal link
between mindwandering and well-being. First, we advanced the
idea that mindwandering can convey affective benefits, in spite
of negative feelings about mental disengagement. Using fMRI in
a unique individual, we found (1) an association between peri-
ods of active mindwandering and increased activity in reward
areas of the brain and (2) spontaneous correlations during rest
between important default network areas and these same reward
regions. By no means do we seek to imply that all mindwander-
ing experiences are pleasurable. Our aim was to highlight that the
affect experienced while mindwandering and the affective reac-
tions to identifying a mindwandering episode are dissociable. We
presented evidence of this in an individual being treated for a day-
dreaming compulsion (Schupak and Rosenthal, 2009). Whether
the findings generalize beyond this particular person is certainly
an open question. However, we suspect she is not unique in her
ability to enjoy her off task-moments despite a concern about
their occurrence.
We also probed the idea that people’s beliefs (lay theo-
ries) about mindwandering may substantially color the affec-
tive responses they anticipate after a mindwandering episode
(Study 2). Using a survey study, we showed that participants who
endorsed negative lay beliefs about mindwandering also antic-
ipated negative affective reactions following a mindwandering
episode. Likewise, people who believe periodic disengagement
from the external environment is a natural feature of our infor-
mation processing system anticipated less negativity following
a mindwandering episode than people who don’t endorse this
causal account of mindwandering. Importantly, Study 2 falls
short of demonstrating that people who hold a lay belief that
mindwandering causes negative moods are incorrect. Future
research is required to examine this possibility in greater detail.
Still, these results indicate a need to take account of lay theories
of mindwandering when interpreting the affective data reported
following a mindwandering event.
We conclude that the relationship between mindwandering
and affect is complex and that far greater specification is needed
before firm conclusions can be drawn regarding the causal pro-
cesses at play. In lieu of such evidence, it seems appropriate to
refrain from assuming our capacity for decoupling attention to
ongoing tasks and events necessarily diminishes our happiness.
Future research might examine the conditions under which this
decoupling ability poses a risk to our emotional wellbeing and
when it confers emotional benefits.
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APPENDIX
AFFECTIVE REACTIONS TO MINDWANDERING: fMRI STUDY
Method
Participant. The participant is a professionally accomplished 40-
year-old female presenting with a long history of excessive and
highly structured daydreaming which she states has contributed
to considerable distress during periods of her life, despite being
a “treasured activity”. The patient does not smoke, drink, or use
drugs and has no abuse or trauma in her history. More details of
her situation can be found in the case report written by Schupak
and Rosenthal (2009).
Procedure. The participant performed three different tasks. She
was instructed to let her mind wander freely when prompted with
the word “daydream” (i.e., during the mindwandering blocks),
to actively prevent her mind from wandering when prompted
with the word “control” (i.e., during the mindwandering suppres-
sion blocks), and to indicate whether the word on the screen was
abstract or concrete during the “concentrate” blocks (Pagnoni
et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). To obtain whole brain
images quickly, we utilized echo-planar imaging (EPI) technol-
ogy. Each of the two EPI series consisted of six mindwandering
blocks (each lasted 60–80 s. in duration), three blocks of active
mindwandering prevention (each lasted 30 s. in duration), and
three blocks of the lexical decision task (each lasted 30 s. in
duration). Ten seconds of fixation were interspersed between task
blocks.
The stimuli were presented using Presentation (version 12.1)
and back projected with an LCD projector onto a screen at the
end of a magnet bore, which the participant viewed by way of
a mirror mounted on the head coil. We placed pillow and foam
cushions within the head coil to minimize head movements.
Image acquisition. We collected all images using a GE scanner
with a standard head coil. We collected T1-weighted anatomical
images using a 3-D sequence (SPGR; 180 axial slices, TR = 19ms,
TE = 5ms, flip angle = 20◦, FOV = 25.6 cm, slice thickness =
1mm,matrix= 256 × 256), and collected functional images with
a gradient echo EPI sequence (each volume comprised 27 slices,
4mm thick, 0mm skip; TR = 2 s, TE = 35ms, FOV = 19.2 cm,
64 × 64 matrix; 84◦ flip angle). We collected a total of 720 image
volumes across two runs that were each 12min in duration.
Data analysis. We analyzed fMRI data using Statistical
Parametric Mapping software (SPM5, Welcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). For each functional run,
we preprocessed the data to remove sources of noise and arti-
fact. Preprocessing included slice timing and motion correction,
co-registration to the participant’s anatomical data, normaliza-
tion to the ICBM 152 brain template (Montreal Neurological
Institute), and spatial smoothing with an 8mm (full-width-at-
half-maximum) Gaussian kernel.
A general linear model with 28 regressors was specified
(Friston et al., 1994). The model included a regressor for each
of the three block types (concentrate, mindwandering, mind-
wandering suppression; 6 total), a regressor for each of the
first four volumes collected in the two EPI series (8 total), six
motion-related regressors for each series (12 total), and the two
SPM constant terms. We used the general linear model to com-
pute parameter estimates (β) and t-contrast images for each
comparison at each voxel.
Results
Results of a direct contrast revealed significantly greater activity in
both bilateral dorsal (peak MNI= 24, 16, −14; t(670) = 6.44, p <
0.001, uncorrected) and bilateral ventral (nACC; peak MNI = 10,
22, −10; t(670) = 5.84, p < 0.0001, uncorrected) striatum during
mindwandering blocks relative to concentration blocks. Results
of a direct contrast also revealed significantly greater activity in
bilateral dorsal striatum (peak MNI = −20, 12, 0; t(670) = 4.07,
p < 0.001, uncorrected) duringmindwandering blocks relative to
mindwandering suppression blocks. See Figure 1.
AFFECTIVE REACTIONS TO MINDWANDERING: FUNCTIONAL
CONNECTIVITY STUDY
Materials and procedure
We instructed the participant to keep her eyes open and look at a
centrally presented fixation cross (“+”).
Image acquisition
The T1 and T2 imaging parameters used in the functional imag-
ing study were used here. We collected a total of 360 image
volumes across two runs that were each 6min in duration.
Preprocessing
We carried out image preprocessing using FSL (Woolrich et al.,
2009). Anatomical images were skull stripped using BET and
partial volume estimates for gray matter (GM), white matter
(WM), and cerebrospinal fluid/non-brain tissue (CSF) obtained
using FLS’s FAST. All EPIs were slice time corrected, realigned to
the first image, and unwarped to correct for movement artifacts
(Andersson et al., 2009). The T1-weighted structural image was
coregistered to the mean EPI image and spatially normalized to
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) T1-weighted template
in FSL, resulting in 2mm × 2mm × 2mm voxels. EPI images
were high pass filtered (100 s cutoff) and spatially smoothed
using an isotropic Gaussian filter (6mm FWHM). We prepro-
cessed both resting-state sessions identically. Before connectivity
analysis, we dropped the first 20 images to remove transients.
Seed selection
We defined a seed region based on the participant’s anatomical
data. We defined the seed signal as the average signal in a sphere
of a 10mm radius centered on the nACC seed (MNI coordinates:
14, 10, −6).
Functional connectivity analysis
A good general introduction to this type of analysis is given else-
where (Fox et al., 2005); we describe our own implementation
here. We selected all brain voxels using the extracted, whole-brain
normalized anatomical image. We considered voxels in this image
passing an intensity threshold of 0.1 (maximum intensity 1.0) as
belonging to the brain. We used partial volume images produced
from FAST to compute detrended mean WM and CSF images;
we used any voxel with intensity greater than 0.5 in the WM
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and CSF images in constructing the mean WM and CSF signals,
respectively. Before mean seed signal computation, we regressed
all six motion parameters, mean WM and mean CSF, and their
first derivatives (16 time series) out of the brain data. We then
used these residual images in seed-signal calculation (described
above) and subsequent functional correlation. Before calculation
of seed-voxel correlations, we resampled all signals to remove the
effects of serial autocorrelation. We then constructed correlation
images for both resting state sessions. For each correlation com-
puted, we used a simple bootstrap to estimate confidence limits
(Chernick, 1999). We bootstrapped each correlation 200 times
and computed 95% confidence intervals using the bootstrap dis-
tribution. If a correlation’s 95% CI overlapped zero, we deemed
the correlation insignificant. Doing so produced an image for
each resting state session; we displayed correlations in Figure 2
only if they were significantly different from zero in both resting
state sessions.
LAY THEORIES OF MINDWANDERING
Method
Participants. A total of 378 individuals recruited via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk marketplace completed the study. We excluded
17 participants from the analysis for failing to provide an accu-
rate response to either of two items that we included as a quality
control measure.
Procedure. Participants were told that we were interested in how
they would feel in a hypothetical situation. They were told that,
although they would not have much information about the situ-
ation, they should answer the questions that followed to the best
of their ability. Each participant was then prompted to imagine
that we asked him or her to perform a task for about 4–5min and
that, 2-min and 15 s into performing the task, they noticed their
mind had wandered to another topic. That is, they caught them-
self thinking about something that was unrelated to the ongoing
task. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which the
following would characterize their mood at that precise moment
in time (i.e., just after noticing that your mind wandered) on a
scale from 1= very slightly or not at all to 5= extremely (Tellegen
et al., 1988; PANAS).
After participants reported their anticipated post-wandering
mood, they were asked to indicate the extent to which they
agreed with various statements about the causes of mindwander-
ing. More specifically, that it is caused by (1) dull tasks (To what
extent do you think your mindwandering mostly occurs because
of dull or monotonous tasks/events? To what extent do you think
the reason for most of your mindwandering has nothing to do
with the dullness of ongoing tasks or events?); (2) natural state of
the mind (To what extent do you think most of your mindwan-
dering occurs because attention tends to wax and wane naturally?
In other words, most of it occurs because the mind tends to peri-
odically disengage from ongoing events and activities? To what
extent do you think the reason for most of your mindwandering
has nothing to do with the mind’s tendency to periodically dis-
engage from ongoing events and activities?); (3) important topics
(To what extent do you thinkmost of yourmindwandering occurs
because important topics tend to capture your attention? To what
extent do you think most of the reason for your mindwandering
has nothing to do with the tendency for important topics captur-
ing your attention?); (4) distractible dispositions (To what extent
do you think most of your mindwandering occurs because you
are a distractible person? To what extent do you think the rea-
son for most of your mindwandering has nothing to do with how
distractible you are?); (5) worrisome topics (To what extent do
you think most of your mindwandering occurs because you are
worried about the topics that capture your attention? To what
extent do you think the reason for most of your mindwandering
has nothing to do with being worried about the topics that cap-
ture your attention?); and (6) enjoyable topics (To what extent do
you think most of your mindwandering occurs because you enjoy
thinking about the topics that capture your attention? To what
extent do you think the reason for most of your mindwandering
had nothing to do with enjoying thinking about the topics that
capture your attention?).
Finally, participants were asked to report their age, gender, and
ethnicity.
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